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ABA ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
WRITING COMPETITION WINNER

“Good Fences Make Good Neighbors”
AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FRAMEWORK TO
PROTECT PROHIBITION BEYOND RESERVATION
BORDERS
Sean J. Wright†
INTRODUCTION
“My apple trees will never get across
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.
He only says, ‘Good fences make good neighbors.’”1
- Robert Frost

In Whiteclay, Nebraska, a desolate town of 10 people, four
rickety shacks line the main road. On average, 13,000 cans of beer
and bottles of malt liquor are sold per day from these shacks.2 The
closest sizeable city is two hours north, but just 240 yards across
the state line into South Dakota is the expansive Pine Ridge Indian

† J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, 2013; M.A. in
Public Policy and Management, The Ohio State University John Glenn School of Public
Affairs, 2013; B.A. in Political Science and History, Miami University, 2009. I would
like to thank Dean Kathy Northern for encouraging me to develop the independent
study that led to this piece and Professor Cinnamon Carlarne for her helpful comments
and continued support. I must thank my family for always supporting my dreams—the
title is in your honor. Finally, a special thanks is due to my wonderful fiancée, Dania
Korkor, for reviewing numerous drafts and inspiring me every day.
1 Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in NORTH OF BOSTON 12 (1914).
2 See Timothy Williams, Indian Beer Bill Stalls; Industry Money Flows, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/us/nebraska-bill-on-beersales-near-reservation-is-stalled.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting that this amounts
to nearly four million cans a year).
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Reservation.3 There, alcohol consumption has been prohibited since
1834.4 Nearly all the alcohol sold in Whiteclay “winds up on Pine
Ridge or is consumed by its residents, tribal officials say.”5 Pine
Ridge is home to the Oglala Sioux Tribe and according to 2010
census data is one of the poorest places in the country.6 Whiteclay’s
singular purpose is to make alcohol available for consumption
across the border. This effectively undermines prohibition and
negates the decision of the Oglala Sioux to remain dry.
In 2010, the tribal police made 20,000 alcohol-related
arrests.7 According to the tribal president, 90% of the criminal
cases brought in the tribal courts and a similar number of
reservation illnesses were caused by alcohol—“the vast majority of
which, he said, was brought illegally from Whiteclay.”8 Nationally,
excessive alcohol consumption is the leading cause of preventable
death among American Indians; affecting that population at twice
the rate of the national average.9 Alcoholism among American
Indian populations is well known; thus, the decision to remain dry
is based on a legitimate public health concern.
The convoluted history of regulating alcohol in Indian
country,10 the historical harms alcohol has had on indigenous
3 Timothy Williams, At Tribes Door, A Hub of Beer and Heartache, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/us/next-to-tribe-with-alcoholban-a-hub-of-beer.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&.
4 See Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729; see also Act of July 22, 1790,
ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (regulating trade with Indian tribes); Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2
Stat. 139 (same). The Act of 1834 restated “no ardent spirits shall hereafter be
introduced, under any pretense, into the Indian country.” Id. The Pine Ridge
Reservation has remained dry except for a brief period in the late 1960s. See Pine Ridge
Reservation, S. Dak. Ordinance Legalizing Introduction, Sale or Possession of Intoxicants,
34 Fed. Reg. 3701 (Mar. 1, 1969); Pine Ridge Reservation, S. Dak. Ordinance Legalizing
Introduction, Sale or Possession of Intoxicants, 35 Fed. Reg. 9219 (June 12, 1970). Quickly,
the tribe reverted to prohibition. See Phillip May, Alcohol Beverage Control: A Survey of
Tribal Alcohol Statutes, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 217, 222 (1977).
5 Williams, supra note 3.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Alcohol-Attributable Deaths and
Years of Potential Life Lost Among American Indians and Alaska Natives—United
States, 2001–2005, 57 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 938, 938-39 (Aug. 29,
2008), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5734a3.htm.
10 Generally Indian country is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) as,

(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of
a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
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tribes, and the scope of tribal authority to control activity within
reservation borders are well known.11 What is unclear, however, is
the extent to which tribes are able to assert their rights beyond the
border of the reservation.12 Wading into further turbidity, tribal
authority to regulate the sale of alcohol in Indian country is not an
inherent sovereign power of Indian tribes; rather, Congress has
delegated powers of the federal government to “regulate behavior
that would otherwise be beyond the reach of their power.”13
To unpack how and when tribal governments can assert
authority outside the boundaries of their reservations, this essay
suggests framing the regulation of alcohol flowing into Indian
country as an environmental justice concern. In turn, utilizing
environmental justice tools and strategies can illuminate how
tribes should approach limiting the harmful effects the flow of
alcohol has upon their communities. This can be framed as an
environmental justice issue because the problem that tribes face
is that their decision to remain dry is undermined, which
produces an inequitable distribution of environmental hazards.
Because tribal governments are limited jurisdictionally and are
thus unable to directly limit transboundary activity, tribal
communities continue to be exposed to a public health risk.14
The purpose of environmental justice is to minimize
environmental inequality.15 Framed as an environmental justice
concern, Indian tribes who decide to remain dry should not be
undermined by extraterritorial threats. In the context of Indian
Federal prohibition policy, however, has narrowed to the definition in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1154(c) which states:
The term ‘Indian country’ as used in this section does not include feepatented lands in non-Indian communities or rights-of-way through Indian
reservations, and this section does not apply to such lands or rights-of-way in
the absence of a treaty or statute extending the Indian liquor laws thereto.
11 See Peggy Anderson, Yakama’s Reservationwide Alcohol Ban Upheld, SEATTLE
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2000, 12:00 AM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/
archive/?date=20001216&slug=TT972LSGL.
12 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Tribal Sovereign Interests Beyond the
Reservation Borders, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2008).
13 Mark T. Baker, Note, The Hollow Promise of Tribal Promise of Tribal Power to
Control the Flow of Alcohol into Indian Country, 88 VA. L. REV. 685, 686–87 (2002); see United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (“These same cases, in addition, make clear that
when Congress delegated its authority to control the introduction of alcoholic beverages into
Indian country, it did so to entities which possess a certain degree of independent authority
over matters that affect the internal and social relations of tribal life. Clearly the distribution
and use of intoxicants is just such a matter.”).
14 See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 9, at 938–39.
15 See generally Tseming Yang, Melding Civil Rights and Environmentalism:
Finding Environmental Justice’s Place in Environmental Regulation, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1 (2002).
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country, “the concept of environmental justice is not very useful
unless it is broader than just the intersection of civil rights and
environmental law.”16 Instead, “in Indian country a vision of
environmental justice must also include the tribal right of selfgovernment.”17 This promotion of tribal self-government cannot
occur without an ability to control and improve their reservation.18
Without such authority, an injustice occurs.19 After 179 years of
prohibition, the Oglala Sioux are still fighting to stop the flow of
alcohol into their reservation. Their inability to do so effectively is
an injustice.
Framed as an environmental justice concern, not only
does the continued flow of alcohol into Indian country represent
an inequitable distribution of environmental risk, but the
siting of alcohol distribution centers near reservations is an
example of locally undesirable land uses (LULUs).20 As the
environmental justice movement has made clear, “[s]everal
major studies have found that hazardous waste sites, solid
waste dumps, polluting factories, and other locally undesirable
land uses are located in areas that contain, on average, a higher
percentage of racial minorities and are poorer than nonhost
communities.”21 As of now, the (dry) Pine Ridge Reservation is
one of the poorest areas of the country and is exposed to over 4.3

16 Dean B. Suagee, The Indian Country Environmental Justice Clinic: From
Vision to Reality, 23 VT. L. REV. 567, 572 (1999).
17 Id.
18 See Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Sovereignty and Environmental Justice, in
JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND APPLICATIONS 161,
163 (Kathryn M. Mutz et al. eds., 2002) (“[E]nvironmental justice for tribes must be
consistent with the promotion of tribal self-governance.”).
19 See Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The
Impact of Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1632 (2007).
20 For a general discussion of LULUs see Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land
Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics? 103 YALE L.J.
1383, 1384 (1994). Essentially, the Environmental Justice movement purports that people of
color and other minorities are exposed to greater environmental harms than wealthier
individuals. Importantly, the siting of “waste dumps, polluting factories, and other locally
undesirable land uses (LULUs) have been racist and classist.” Id. Moreover,

Examples of LULUs are many. Some are well-known and a source of frequent
objections, such as adult use establishments. Other LULUs may include uses that
are widely used and needed and are often well-established in their locations, but
whose well-known emissions of odor or noise—such as airports, landfills, or
asphalt plants—become problematic as new neighbors move toward these uses.
Victor P. Filippini, Jr., Dealing with Locally Unwanted Land Uses (Lulus): A Municipal
Perspective Many Tools Are Available, but in the Long Run the Best Thing to Do Is to
Build A Consensus, PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., Mar. 2010, at 21, 22.
21 Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting: RiskBased Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 337 (1995).
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million cans of beer and malt liquor a year.22 Thus, analyzing the
application of environmental justice responses to LULUs can
elucidate how tribes can and should respond.
The benefits of framing the problem within the
environmental justice framework are twofold. First, this essay
presents a novel approach to conceptualizing environmental
justice. As scholars debate the future of environmental poverty
lawyering, it is helpful to take stock of the successes the movement
has had in addressing the inequitable siting of environmental
harm. As this essay will establish, environmental justice strategies
can provide a roadmap to address inequity beyond the traditional
areas of concern.23 Second, framing alcohol prohibition within the
context of environmental justice will inform the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) as it develops Plan EJ 2014.24 As the EPA
attempts to integrate environmental justice into agency programs,
policies, and activities, this framing will establish alcohol
prohibition as a necessary cross-agency focus area.25
This essay makes an important and innovative contribution
to the scholarly literature on tribal environmental justice,26 the
“good neighbor” principle,27 and enforcing policy beyond borders.
Ultimately, tribal governments must be enabled to ensure their
policy decisions are enforceable. This requires enforcement beyond
the borders of the reservation. By conceptualizing prohibition
under an environmental justice paradigm, tribes have a direct
proxy of when and how to enforce their policy decisions outside
their border—environmental statutes.28 Additionally, a significant
bulk of scholarly attention has been paid to when and how tribes
can exercise jurisdiction over non-members who venture inside
Williams, supra note 3.
See infra Part IV.
24 In fact, the EPA has specifically sought tribal consultation on “Cross-Agency
Focus Areas, Tools Development, and Program Initiatives” through Plan EJ 2014. See OFFICE
OF ENVTL. JUSTICE, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TRIBAL CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION PLAN:
EPA’S PLAN EJA 2014, available at http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/
policy/plan-ej-2014/plan-ej-tribal-consult.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
25 Id.
26 Krakoff, supra note 18.
27 See Janet V. Siegel, Negotiating for Environmental Justice: Turning Polluters
Into “Good Neighbors” Through Collaborative Bargaining, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 147 (2002).
28 “[E]nvironmental justice advocates have sought to use the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Protection Act (NHPA), the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the Civil Rights Act, the Clean Water
Act (CWA) and the Clean Air Act (CAA) to pursue citizen suits to remedy
environmental injustice.” Melissa O’Connor, A Failure to Protect: After 13 Years
Environmental Justice Never Materializes, 35 S.U. L. REV. 119, 123 (2007) (citations
omitted). Also, grassroots advocacy remains a constant reform strategy. See Luke W.
Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 637 (1992).
22
23
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their borders,29 and the Supreme Court has restricted this right
in significant ways.30 But the literature has only begun to
discuss extraterritorial authority.31 This essay explores the
ability of tribes to reach beyond their borders and limit the flow
of pollution under the various environmental statutes—
particularly the Clean Air Act (CAA) and Clean Water Act
(CWA)—and suggests that environmental law offers a model
approach for reenvisioning/remodeling prohibition policy.
Part I of this essay frames prohibition as an environmental
justice concern requiring transboundary enforcement, which is
frequently observed in international environmental law. Part II
reviews the history of federal Indian alcohol policy—in particular
how the Pine Ridge Reservation has struggled to maintain
prohibition—finding that legislative and judicial outcomes have
limited tribal powers delegated to them by Congress. Part III
argues that, analytically, tribes have the same authority to reach
beyond their borders to protect public health in much the same
way that tribes implement environmental laws—through
cooperative-federalism. Finally, Part IV proposes three possible
approaches based upon environmental justice tools and strategies
to effectuate tribal decisions to remain dry.
I.

FRAMING TRIBAL PROHIBITION AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE CONCERN

Environmental justice seeks to address the disparate
distribution of environmental harms throughout society.32
Understood in this context, the environment “include[s] the
29 See, e.g., ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTARY 517−628 (2d ed. 2010).
30 See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S.
316 (2008) (holding that the tribe could regulate the actions of non-Indians on the
reservation); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (holding that tribal authority over
non-members beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government is not
available without express congressional delegation); Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of
nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within a reservation, barring limited exceptions);
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that tribal courts do
not have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians).
31 See Patrice H. Kunech, Borders Beyond Borders—Protecting Essential
Tribal Relations Off Reservation Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 42 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 15, 15-16 (2007); Skibine, supra note 12, at 1003.
32 See generally Mariá Ramirez Fisher, On the Road from Environmental
Racism to Environmental Justice, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 449, 449-52 (1994); Robert R.
Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10681, 10682 (2000);
Clifford Rechtschaffen, Advancing Environmental Justice Norms, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 95, 96 (2003); Gerald Torres, Introduction: Understanding Environmental
Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839, 839–40 (1992).
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ecological, physical, social, political, aesthetic, and economic
environments.”33 Alcohol is a public health threat in Indian
country.34 Framing the continued flow of alcohol into dry Indian
country as an environmental justice concern provides a
structure to explore various new approaches to this longstanding
issue. When facing public health threats from industrialization,
pollution, and contamination, several tools and strategies
undertaken by the environmental justice movement can shed
light on how to respond to targeted siting of environmental
harms.35 However, tribal environmental justice is different from
the broader environmental justice movement. Based upon a
unique history of subjugation and exclusion, tribal justice
requires not only addressing environmental harm but also
supporting tribal self-determination. Additionally, some
mechanism for tribes to enforce public health concerns beyond the
border must be implemented. Looking to international
environmental law is illustrative for these purposes.
A.

Tribal Environmental Justice

Unfortunately, “whether by conscious design or
institutional neglect, communities of color in urban ghettos, in
rural ‘poverty pockets,’ or on economically impoverished NativeAmerican reservations face some of the worst environmental
devastation.”36 The Environmental Justice movement has
addressed these concerns in a variety of ways.37 These approaches
provide a lodestar toward addressing the harmful effects of
alcohol distribution throughout Indian reservations.
Environmental justice is based upon the premise that
the underprivileged and people of color bear a disproportionate
share of society’s environmental burdens.38 Over the past two
Yang, supra note 15, at 19.
See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 9, at 938–39; see
also A. Mercedes Nails et al., American Indian Youth’s Perception of Their
Environment and Their Reports of Depressive Symptoms and Alcohol/Marijuana Use,
44 ADOLESCENCE 965, 968 (2009) (noting that American Indian youths begin drinking
earlier than non-Indian peers).
35 See KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE:
READINGS ON THE PRACTICE AND PURPOSES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 246−315 (3d ed.
2007) (examining legal tools and strategies to resolve inequalities in facility siting).
36 Robert
D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the
Environmental Justice Movement, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES
FROM THE GRASSROOTS 15, 17−19 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993).
37 See MANASTER, supra note 35, at 246−315.
38 ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 1 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that “[a]n abundance of documentation shows blacks, lower33

34
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decades, the movement has sought to address these inequities.
The environmental justice movement has established a variety of
important findings. First, there are distributional impacts of
environmental rules.39 This means that environmental
regulations may have a demonstrable—and harmful—impact on
minority communities. Frequently, industrialization takes on a
“not in my backyard” (NIMBY) tone. Thus, “because noxious sites
are unwanted . . . and because industries tend to take the path of
least resistance, communities with little political clout are often
targeted for such facilities.”40 Second, lacking political influence,
minority communities are unable to organize as effectively as
majority communities and this leads to underrepresentation in
governing bodies, which in turn leads to further limited access
to policymakers.41
Environmental justice claims by Native Americans have
typically fallen into two camps: “claims for regulatory control
over reservation lands,”42 and “claims by indigenous peoples
that they have unique interests and ought to be represented as
‘rights-holders’ in national or international decision-making that
impacts their communities.”43 These claims are intrinsically
linked to the fundamental difference between the environmental
justice movement generally and tribal environmental justice—
tribal sovereignty.44 While Indian country has been significantly
harmed by environmental hazards,45 tribal leaders advance the
belief that unlike other communities of color, Indian communities
primarily suffered from the federal government’s devaluing of
tribal sovereignty and resulting paternalistic management
policies.46 As part of advancing tribal self-government to redress
income groups, and working-class persons are subjected to a disproportionately large
amount of pollution and other environmental stressors”).
39 Torres, supra note 32, at 840.
40 Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the
Evidence, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 164 (Bunyan
Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992).
41 See id.
42 Tsosie, supra note 19, at 1627.
43 Id. at 1627-28.
44 Id. at 1631-32; see also Judith V. Royster, Native American Law, in THE LAW OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE
RISKS 200 (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008).
45 See, e.g., THADIS BOX ET AL., REHABILITATION POTENTIAL OF WESTERN COAL
LANDS 85 (1974) (describing pollution and permanent damage from strip mining in Navajo
country); BOYCE RICHARDSON, STRANGERS DEVOUR THE LAND (1976); Jeanette Wolfley,
Tribal Authority to Regulate Air Quality, 2000A ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13B (2000)
(describing air quality degradation in Indian country).
46 Tsosie, supra note 19, at 1632; Royster, supra note 44, at 199 (“Indian
tribes connect to their lands not only on economic and emotional levels, but also on the
levels of culture, religion, and sovereignty.”).
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environmental injustice, Professor Sarah Krakoff believes that
environmental justice can be coextensive with recognition of tribal
regulatory authority.47 The federal government’s acknowledgment
of tribes’ treatment as state (TAS) status reinforces selfgovernance.48 In fact, “the active exercise of tribal regulatory
authority over the reservation environment is seen as an antidote
to the perceived victimization of reservation communities by
exploitive and environmentally hazardous industries.”49 Thus,
resolving any environmental justice dispute—such as the flow of
alcohol—through a tribal regulatory framework is the panacea to
existing injustice.
Collectively, the environmental justice movement has
advanced in fits and starts. The high-point of the Environmental
Justice movement came when President Clinton signed Executive
Order 12,898. The President required that “each Federal
agency . . . make achieving environmental justice part of its
mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate,
disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on
minority populations, and low-income populations.”50 Since that
time, the federal government has become more aware of how
decision-making processes impact minority communities. In fact,
the EPA has an Advisory Council on Environmental Justice. Part
of this council is an Indigenous Peoples Subcommittee tasked with
ensuring that Native peoples have a role in environmental
decision-making. These advances, however, have not translated to
successful legal challenges to unjust siting of environmental harms.
Outside of the major environmental statutes, Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 196451 was long seen as the viable vehicle for
litigating environmental justice claims. But in 2001, the Supreme
Court limited the likely success of these claims. In Alexander v.
Sandoval, the Court ruled that there is no private right of action to
enforce disparate impact regulations under Title VI.52 This ruling
Krakoff, supra note 18, at 163.
See infra Part III.
49 Tsosie, supra note 19, at 1632.
50 See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 6-609 (1995); see also Bradford C.
Mank, Executive Order 12,898, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES
AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS, supra note 44, at 142 ((“The
Order and the accompanying memorandum have already had a major impact on how
agencies integrate environmental justice issues into their activities.”).
51 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
52 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
47

48
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was further narrowed by the Third Circuit in South Camden
Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection.53 The Third Circuit found that not only did the plaintiffs
lack standing to bring claims of discrimination under Title VI, but
that Title VI did not create freestanding rights enforceable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.54 To a large extent, the limitations of disparate
impact litigation are in stark contrast with successful challenges
raised through environmental statutes.55 A key takeaway from the
nearly two decades of environmental justice litigation is that
alternative avenues for remedy are necessary.
B.

Preventing Transboundary Harms: The International
Environmental Law Framework

Extending a tribe’s reach beyond its territorial boundaries
is akin to the prerogative of nation-state sovereigns within
international environmental law. In fact, prohibiting activity
beyond one’s border is a cornerstone of this legal regime.56 The
origins of this principle stem from an arbitration between the
United States and Canada. The award from the Trail Smelter
Arbitration remains one of the modern touchstones of international
environmental law because it established the principle that
transboundary harms were to be prevented.57 As a basic overview,
“[t]he case involved air pollution that originated in a smelter in
Trail, British Columbia, and caused damage to farmlands located
south of the Canada–United States border, in Washington State.”58
The United States and Canada twice submitted the dispute for
arbitration. However, it was the final decision in 1941 that set forth
a cornerstone of international environmental law.
In key part, the arbiters found that “no state has the right
to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
53 South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274
F.3d 771, 790 (3d Cir. 2001).
54 Id. at 790.
55 See Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David’s
Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 526 (1994) (noting that challenges under environmental
statutes are the most preferred method of redressing environmental justice concerns); see
also First Nat’l Bank v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1377-78 (7th Cir. 1973).
56 See Corfu Channel Case (Alb. v. U.K.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Dec. 15). For other
cases that endorse the prohibition of the transboundary injurious use of natural
resources as a rule of customary international law, see Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 4 (July 8), and Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
(Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 4 (Sept. 25).
57 See generally Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941),
reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 685 (1941).
58 Jutta Brunnée, Book Review, Transboundary Harm in International Law:
Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 395, 395 (2008).
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cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence.”59 This “no harm” rule remains a common conceptual
underpinning governing state activity that has been reaffirmed in
various international agreements60 and by the International Court
of Justice (ICJ).61
There is a strong lesson to be learned from these
transboundary environmental conflicts that could have a bearing
on Indian prohibition. The general idea that “nations have a
responsibility to not allow their territory to be used in ways that
cause environmental harm to, or within, the territory of other
nations”62 can be applied to the flow of alcohol. The Oglala Sioux
have remained dry since 1834 but have consistently been in
conflict with bootleggers and liquor distributers to stop the flow of
alcohol into Indian country. Based on the well-known harmful
effect alcohol has on Indian communities63 and the struggles the
Oglala Sioux have with illegal alcohol,64 the town of Whiteclay
is violating the “no harm” principle. By setting up four liquor
stores in a town of barely 10 residents meant to serve a dry
community, the nearly 4.3 million cans of beer and malt liquor
sold a year directly harm the territory of another nation. Tribes
need to be empowered to prevent their tribal decisions from
being undermined by external forces.
II.

FIREWATER AND SOVEREIGNTY: AN OVERVIEW OF INDIAN
ALCOHOL PROHIBITION

Before addressing the specific parameters of federal tribal
prohibition, it is helpful to establish the rights and prerogatives of
Indian tribes to dictate activities on reservations and over nonmembers. Thus, this part will begin by discussing the nature of
tribal sovereignty generally and move specifically through the
Trail Smelter Case, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. at 716 (responding to Question 2).
See, e.g., United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, princ. 21,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Corr.1 (June 16, 1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420
(1972); United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, princ. 2, U.N.C.E.D. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1
(June 14, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 876 (1992).
61 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 29 (July 8).
62 AARON
SCHWABACH, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A
REFERENCE HANDBOOK 15 (2006).
63 See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 9, at 938-39.
64 See Williams, supra note 3.
59

60
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changing landscape of tribal authority over the flow of alcohol into
Indian country.
A.

An Overview of Tribal Sovereignty

Tribal sovereignty is a varied and fluid concept.
Attempting to discern the developing nature of this sovereignty,
Felix Cohen chronicled three changes or principles that mark the
modern day conception of tribal sovereignty. First, “prior to
European contact, a tribe possessed ‘all the powers of any
sovereign state.’”65 Second, following European conquest, tribes
were “subject to the legislative power of the United States” and
were stripped of their external sovereign powers.66 Third, “tribes
retain internal sovereignty ‘subject to qualification by treaties and
by express legislation of Congress.’ Thus, tribal powers generally
are not ‘delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress,’
but instead are ‘inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which
have never been extinguished.’”67 However, there are instances
where Congress delegates authority to tribal governments. In
doing so, the tribe receives Congressional authorization to act
in a similar manner as states in the federal system.
Contemporary prohibition of alcohol is one such example.
B.

The Historical Development of Indian Liquor Laws

The prohibition of alcohol on tribal lands has been part of
the American experience since the founding. Following the
American Revolution, the newly formed government began
negotiating directly with Indian tribes to regulate trade and
commerce.68 During these negotiations, tribal leaders implored the
federal government to restrict the flow of alcohol to tribes through
traders.69 President Thomas Jefferson is said to have been inspired
to limit the flow of alcohol to tribes after hearing from a leading
Indian chief about the devastating effects alcohol had on his
people.70 President Jefferson was so moved by this letter that he

FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 123 (1941).
Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1999).
67 Id.
68 Baker, supra note 13, at 690. For a more detailed discussion of early
prohibition, see Robert J. Miller & Maril Hazlett, The “Drunken Indian”: Myth Distilled
into Reality Through Federal Indian Alcohol Policy, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 223, 239–46 (1996).
69 LAURENCE ARMAND FRENCH, ADDICTIONS AND NATIVE AMERICANS 18 (2000).
70 Id. In his letter, Chief Little Turtle said:
65

66
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called upon Congress to end the flow of alcohol into Indian
country.71 Beseeching Congress, the President said, “These people
(the Indians) are becoming very sensible of the baneful effects
produced on their morals, their health, and existence, by the abuse
of ardent spirits: and some of them earnestly desire a prohibition of
that article from being carried among them. The Legislature will
consider whether”72 legislative action can be taken.
Congressional response was quick. Under the Act of
1802, the President was authorized to “take such measures,
from time to time, as to him may appear expedient to prevent
or restrain the vending or distributing of spirituous liquors
among all or any of the said Indian tribes.”73 This act was the
first in a series of enactments meant at curbing the flow of
alcohol to Indians. The negotiations between the federal
government and Indian tribes did not cease after the Act of
1802; rather, a series of Trade and Intercourse Acts were
passed to address various issues in Indian country.74
Collectively, “[t]he Acts outlined the authority of the states and
national government over Indian affairs, rules regarding land
distribution in response to intrusions on Indian land by nonIndian settlers, and the regulation of contact between Indians
and non-Indians on the frontier.”75
The most important Trade and Intercourse Act—for our
present purposes—was the Act of 1834. The Act prohibited the
introduction of and attempts to introduce alcohol into Indian
country. The only exemption was that alcohol could be provided
to officers and troops of the United States. Moreover, the Act

But father, nothing can be done to advantage unless the great council of the Sixteen
Fires, now assembled, will prohibit any person from selling any spirituous liquors
among their red brothers . . . . Father: Your children are not wanting in industry;
but it is the introduction of this fatal poison which keeps them poor. Your children
have not that command over themselves, which you have, therefore, before anything
can be done to advantage, this evil must be remedied. Father: When our white
brothers came to this land, our forefathers were numerous and happy; but, since
their intercourse with the white people, and owing to the introduction of this fatal
poison, we have become less numerous and happy.
7 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, INDIAN AFFAIRS 653, 655 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St.
Claire Clark eds., 1832).
71 FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 352 (Robert L.
Bennett & Frederick M. Hart eds., Five Rings Press 1986) (1942).
72 7 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 70, at 653.
73 Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, § 21, 2 Stat. 139, 146; Miller & Hazlett, supra
note 68, at 240−41.
74 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE
YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS 1790−1834 at 1–3, 43–50 (1962).
75 Baker, supra note 13, at 691.
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clarified the definition of Indian country and established
penalties for violators of the Act.76 While the Act sought to
bring clarity to the issue of alcohol in Indian country, it caused
significant confusion in some areas. For example, an 1854
amendment to the Act, which is no longer in effect, exempted
Indians from prosecution—especially when an individual had
already been prosecuted under tribal law.77
C.

Congressional Delegation to Tribes: Contemporary Policy

Contemporary law regulating the flow of alcohol into Indian
country was codified during an era in which Congress attempted to
abolish tribal sovereign power and assimilate tribal members as
full, taxpaying citizens of the United States. Referred to as the
Termination Era,78 Congress began in the 1950s to end the special
relationship between the federal government and over 100 Indian
tribes.79 These challenges resulted in a variety of important
demographic changes in Indian country. Termination Era policy (1)
changed land ownership patterns in and around Indian country; (2)
ended tribal sovereignty and the trust obligation owed to tribes by
the United States after revoking the special relationship; (3)
granted states jurisdiction over Indian country; (4) revoked state
taxation exemptions; and (5) curtailed tribes’ access to federal
programs for tribes.80
In keeping with the general trend of terminating tribal
recognition and privilege, Congress began to fundamentally
reshape federal Indian prohibition. Beginning in 1948, the absolute
prohibition of introducing alcohol into Indian country, first adopted
by the Act of 1834, was recodified. Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154 and
1156, the sale and distribution of alcohol in Indian country was
considered criminal activity.81 Originally, this prohibition applied
throughout Indian country regardless of who sold or distributed the
alcohol.82 However, a year later, Congress amended the definition
of Indian country to exclude “non-Indian communities or rights-ofMiller & Hazlett, supra note 68, at 242−44.
Id. at 244. This caused significant conflict between the legislature and the courts.
The Act’s impact was unclear; traditionally Indians had the sovereign authority to punish their
own members, but this needed to be codified 20 years later. Thus, as one author has described,
“the Act did more to reduce tribal authority than it did to curb the problems caused by
rampant alcohol abuse in Indian country.” Baker, supra note 13, at n.32.
78 Baker, supra note 13, at 693.
79 Miller & Hazlett, supra note 68, at 262.
80 See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 210–11 (4th ed. 1998).
81 Baker, supra note 13, at 693.
82 Id.
76

77
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way through Indian reservations” unless expressly extended by a
treaty or statute extending prohibition to these now exempt
areas.83 Additionally, Congress left intact § 3113, which includes
broad language permitting any Indian to confiscate alcohol brought
into Indian country and provides the steps federal officials can take
to enforce prohibition.84
This severe treatment was reversed by the mid-1950s. By
1953, Congress began to reject the paternalistic nature of Indian
prohibition—a belief that Indian communities were unable to cope
with alcohol.85 This longstanding belief, termed the “drunken
Indian myth,”86 had persisted from the Act of 1802. In changing the
policy toward prohibition, Congress turned over alcohol regulation
in Indian country to the tribes.87 Overturning nearly 120 years of
strict alcohol prohibition, Congress delegated the power to
determine and apply policy during an era of significant
deterioration in tribal sovereignty. In codifying § 1161, Congress
“restored some of the sovereign powers that the [drunken Indian]
myth had taken away, while on the other hand, it returned a shell
too long eviscerated by prejudice to retain much power.”88 Congress
did limit the sale of alcohol in Indian country to the boundaries of
state law, but otherwise, the scheme relies upon tribal
determination of alcohol policy. If a tribe legalized the flow of
alcohol into Indian country, consistent with requisite state laws,
federal prohibition would subside. Tribes could also choose to
remain dry. This policy change is representative of the federal
government’s current approach toward Indian tribes—selfdetermination.89 The current policy has been to turn control back
over to tribes. The prohibition on alcohol is one of many areas in
which this occurred.
The tribes’ response was mixed. After the first 18
months of passing § 1161, 22 tribes legalized alcohol on their
reservations, and by 1974 that number had grown to 115.90
However, incrementally, tribes began to return to prohibition.
By the 1990s, “approximately sixty-nine percent of the nation’s
293 reservations either immediately passed, or have since
instituted, tribal ordinances ensuring that the blanket federal
Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 28, 63 Stat. 94 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1156).
See 18 U.S.C. § 3113 (2012).
85 Miller & Hazlett, supra note 68, at 225, 263.
86 Id. at 225.
87 See 18 U.S.C. § 1161.
88 Miller & Hazlett, supra note 68, at 225.
89 Id. at 267.
90 Phillip May, Alcohol Beverage Control: A Survey of Tribal Alcohol Statutes,
5 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 217, 223-24 (1977).
83

84
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prohibition stays in place.”91 The most recent national survey
reveals that this trend has dipped, but only slightly. As of 2008,
36% of tribes nationally (121 of 334) remain dry.92 As
mentioned by one author, alcohol bans span the country, from
the Yakama of Washington, to the Navajo of the Southwest,
and the Oglala Sioux in the Dakotas.93 The effectiveness of this
decision faces serious obstacles. Building upon the changes
made during the Termination Era, much of the land within the
exterior boundaries of the reservation belong to non-tribal
members, and sham towns have developed along the borders to
provide alcohol a mere feet outside the prohibited zone.
D.

The Controversy in Pine Ridge

The Oglala Sioux made the decision to prohibit alcohol on
tribal land. But what happens when alcohol distributers establish
stores just outside the border of Indian country? For the Oglala
Sioux, this has been a lingering question that has vexed the tribe
for over a decade.94 This issue also carries significant national
concern. Life expectancy on the reservation is 48 years for men
and 52 for women while the national average is 78.95
Not only does the illegal flow of alcohol harm public health,
it also places a significant burden on the community and law
enforcement. Such has been the case on the Pine Ridge
Reservation. The County Sheriff’s office, responsible for patrolling
and monitoring Whiteclay, is 19 miles away.96 The Sheriff has five
deputies. The tribal police department, which lacks jurisdiction in
Whiteclay, has 38 officers—down from 101 six years ago.97 The
Pine Ridge Reservation is roughly the size of Connecticut and has a
population of approximately 45,000 people including non-tribal
91 Baker, supra note 13, at 694–95 (citing Study Says Tribal Alcohol Ban
Increases Other Risks of Death, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., Mar. 11, 1992, at 7A).
92 Anne E. Kovas et al., Survey of American Indian Alcohol Statutes, 1975–
2006: Evolving Needs and Future Opportunities for Tribal Health, 63 J. STUD. ALCOHOL
& DRUGS 183, 186 (2008).
93 Robert J. Haupt, “Never Lay a Salmon on the Ground with His Head
Towards the River”: State of Washington Sues Yakamas over Alcohol Ban, 26 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 67, 73 (2002).
94 See THE BATTLE FOR WHITECLAY (Glass Onion 2008), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HDAdhOxuTwk.
95 Id.; FastStats: Life Expectancy, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/lifexpec.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2013)
(noting that the national life expectancy is 78.7 years).
96 Timothy Williams, At Tribe’s Door, a Hub of Beer and Heartache¸ N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/us/next-to-tribe-with-alcoholban-a-hub-of-beer.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
97
THE BATTLE FOR WHITECLAY, supra note 94.
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members. Beyond that, in the Pine Ridge Reservation, two-thirds
of the population resides below the poverty line, and the
unemployment rate on the reservation is at 75%.
This subpart will chronicle the history of prohibition in the
Pine Ridge Reservation by the Oglala Sioux people to illustrate the
difficulties many tribes face in administering prohibition policy.
First, the historical challenges in keeping the flow of alcohol out of
the Pine Ridge area will establish the long-standing conflict
between tribal authorities and distributors of alcohol located just
beyond tribal borders. Next, the recent grassroots movements
against extra-territorial distribution will demonstrate the difficulty
tribes face in enforcing the policy when faced with external threats.
Finally, the Oglala Sioux’s recent failure in federal district court
will establish that the Congressional delegation over alcohol policy
is a false promise of greater tribal authority and unenforceable,
especially when undermined by external threats to public health—
by both legislative and judicial means. Something else is needed to
provide redress.
1. The Historical Harms of Alcohol in the Pine Ridge
Reservation
Whiteclay is not a recent development. The sham town
of at most 10 people “is a successor to the so-called whiskey
ranches set up in the 1880s to move alcohol onto what was then
called Pine Ridge Agency.”98 Concerned that bootleggers were
ushering alcohol to the Sioux and at the urging of the U.S.
Indian Agent and Oglala leaders, President Chester A. Arthur
established a 50-square mile buffer zone in Nebraska, south of
the Pine Ridge Reservation.99 By 1889, the Oglala Sioux
received their own reservation,100 establishing the Pine Ridge
Agency. The Agency occupied entirely within the borders of
modern day South Dakota with the 50-mile extension into
Nebraska. In both 1889 and 1890, Congress enacted legislation
to continue the incorporation of the buffer zone, called the
White Clay Extension, into the boundaries of the reservation,

98 Stephanie Woodard, Liquor and Ethnic Cleansing: Whiteclay, Nebraska,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephanie-woodard/
liquor-and-ethnic-cleansi_b_802536.html.
99 Jeff Mohr, The Whiteclay Study Guide: A Study Guide to Accompany the
Documentary Film The Battle for Whiteclay 2, http://www.battleforwhiteclay.org/assets/
TBFW_Study_Guide_0812.doc (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
100 Act of Mar. 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 888.
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but only for “so long as it may be needed for the use and
protection of the Indians . . . at the Pine Ridge Agency.”101
In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt ceded 49 of the 50
square miles into the public domain by executive orders,102 despite
failing to establish that the need for the buffer zone had ceased to
exist. In fact, these executive orders were carried out over the
protests of Oglala leaders and the Indian Agent.103 This caused a
land grab by white settlers who used the land to produce
bootlegged alcohol, though alcohol consumption was still illegal
nationally under the Eighteenth Amendment. Because prohibition
still applied on the reservations, skirting prohibition did not cease
either. Rather, “[t]he bootleggers who first supplied the liquor were
replaced during the second half of the 20th century by bars and
later by retail stores that were—and still are—licensed to operate
by the state of Nebraska.”104 First, in the mid-1950s, the State of
Nebraska licensed two bars in Whiteclay for on-site consumption of
alcohol. After two decades, the owners converted their licenses for
off-site drinking only. However, two more additional off-site stores
were added. Thus, since the 1970s, four permanent off-site (beer
only) liquor stores have served the barely 10-person town of
Whiteclay, Nebraska.
These bars have gained notoriety. They commonly sell
beer to “minors and intoxicated persons, knowingly sell[] to
bootleggers who resell the beer on the reservation, permit[] onpremise consumption of beer in violation of restrictions placed on
off-sale-only licenses, and exchang[e] beer for sexual favors.”105
Absurdly enough, the vast majority of those who purchase beer in
Whiteclay have no legal place to consume the beer. The store’s
permits prohibit on-site consumption of beer and it is illegal to
possess or consume alcohol throughout the entire reservation.
2. Grassroots Efforts to Effectuate Prohibition
Over the years, the Oglala Sioux have tried to spotlight
the tragedy occurring in Whiteclay and encourage the
Nebraska legislature to take action. Largely, they have been
unsuccessful. The grassroots movement to prohibit Whiteclay
Id. at § 1.
Exec. Order, Addition to Pine Ridge Reservation (Jan. 25, 1904), available
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=69484; Exec. Order, Pine Ridge
School Reservation (Feb. 20, 1904), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=69488.
103 Mohr, supra note 99, at 2.
104 Woodard, supra note 98.
105 Mohr, supra note 99, at 2.
101
102

2014]

GOOD FENCES MAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS

1215

from selling alcohol, which undermines the Oglala’s ban on
alcohol, has faced significant resistance from the Nebraskan
government. Over the years, the “Nebraska authorities have
repeatedly said it’s too ‘complicated’ to address the issue of
Whiteclay and the misery it causes.”106 Though a series of
proposed bills have been introduced in the Nebraska legislature,
they have either failed, been gutted, or made little impact.
In 2002, State Senator Donald G. Priester introduced a
law to prohibit issuing any future liquor license within the
original White Clay Extension area, or within five miles of
Indian country where the tribal council had banned the sale
and consumption of alcohol.107 However, the bill grandfathered
in existing liquor licenses, and so the four existing license
holders would be able to continue to sell beer unimpaired.108
Senator Priester’s bill did not even make it out of committee.
Nor did his identical proposal the next year.109 The Nebraska
legislature only went so far as to pass a bill proposed by
Senator Ray Jannsen, which empowered the Nebraska Liquor
Control Commission to hesitate in granting new licenses in
areas saturated with existing licenses.110 This bill passed in a
modified form and was signed into law in 2006.111
During the 2009 session, the Nebraska legislature
commissioned an interim study of Whiteclay. This included
numerous public hearings before the General Affairs and
Judiciary Committees. From this study, two separate bills were
proposed to redress the harmful impact selling alcohol in
Whiteclay was having on the Pine Ridge Reservation. First,
Senator LeRoy Louden introduced a bill that earmarked alcohol
sales tax revenue for economic development and healthcare or law
enforcement assistance.112 The bill was quickly gutted. The
amended bill made no mention of earmarking alcohol tax
revenue, but rather, would establish a meager general assistance
fund for Whiteclay. The final version of the bill was signed into
law with $25,000 set aside for Whiteclay.113 Second, a bill
introduced by Senator Russ Karpisek would have created the
Woodard, supra note 98.
Legis. B. 1306, 97th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2002).
108 Id.
109 Legis. B. 426, 98th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2003).
110 Legis. B. 530, 99th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2005).
111 Legis. B. 845, 99th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2006) (codified at NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 53-132) (provides that the Nebraska Liquor Commission has leeway to withhold
additional licenses based upon new factors).
112 Legis. B. 1002 Introduced Copy, 101st Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. Jan. 20, 2010).
113 Legis. B. 1002 Slip Law Copy, 101st Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2010).
106
107
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Substance Abuse Treatment Grant Program under the Native
American Public Health Act. Unfortunately, this bill had a worse
fate than Louden’s and was indefinitely postponed.114 Senator
Louden submitted another proposed bill. As introduced, the bill
was designed to empower the Liquor Commission to grant
“alcohol impact zone” status on localities to discourage public
inebriation.115 Once an area was designated as an “alcohol impact
zone,” the Liquor Commission was authorized to “promulgate
rules and regulations” of alcohol sales to effectuate this policy.116
This bill also failed to become law.117
Against this backdrop of Nebraskan legislative
impotence, the Oglala Sioux tribe has continued to advocate for
change. This has included blockages, marches, and public
meetings. Specifically, “[a] New Year’s Eve protest of beer sales in
Whiteclay ended peacefully with three of the Nebraska town’s
four alcohol stores closing early and making very few late-night
sales to Natives.”118 Recently, a new alcohol checkpoint has been
set up at the border to try to stop the flow of alcohol into the
reservation.119 Still, all told, the illegal flow of alcohol into Indian
country remains a constant environmental problem.
3. The Federal Judiciary: A Dead End
After failing to produce a grassroots legislative
resolution to the on-going problem in Whiteclay, the Oglala
turned to the federal judiciary. Unfortunately, this too proved to
be a dead end. Tribal leaders brought a lawsuit targeting “major
beer manufacturers, including Coors, Miller and Anheuser Busch,
distributors, and local stores that sell beer.”120 The lawsuit sought
over $500 million to help cover the costs of healthcare, law
enforcement, and social services resulting from over-consumption
114 Legis. B. 1005, 101st Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2010). The bill was indefinitely
postponed. See id. (creating the Substance Abuse Treatment Grant Program under the
Native American Public Health Act), available at http://nebraskalegislature.gov/bills/
view_bill.php?DocumentID=10115 (last visited Apr. 27, 2013).
115 Legis. B. 829, Introduced Copy, 102d Leg., 2d. Sess. (Neb. Jan. 5, 2012).
116 Id. § 5.
117 See id. at 1 (creating “alcohol impact zones”); Williams, supra note 2
(noting the substantial sum paid by the “alcohol lobby” as campaign contributions to
members of the General Affairs Committee who defeated the alcohol impact zone bill).
118 Grant Schulte, Activists: Whiteclay Protest Ended Peacefully, SIOUX CITY J.
(Jan. 1, 2013), http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/nebraska/activistswhiteclay-protest-ended-peacefully/article_14751ba0-5450-11e2-aaca001a4bcf887a.html.
119 Id.
120 South Dakota Tribe Goes Up Against Big Brewers, NPR (Feb. 24, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/2012/02/24/147348297/south-dakota-tribe-goes-up-against-big-brewers.
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of alcohol within the community. Moreover, the tribes sought to
restrict the amount of beer sold in Whiteclay—not to permanently
prevent the operation of liquor in the area.
The case, Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Schwarting, raised three
distinct causes of action: conspiracy to distribute alcohol that
cannot be legally consumed on the reservation, conspiracy to
violate 18 U.S.C. § 1161, and a refusal by the state of Nebraska to
enforce its own statutes.121 The legal argument was premised on
the belief that the brewers and store owners knew the alcohol sold
would go to individuals with no legal place to consume it, and thus
knew that individuals were purchasing the alcohol to smuggle it
into the reservation for illegal use or resale.
The federal district court in Nebraska dismissed the suit,
without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction. Essentially, the court
held that it lacked jurisdiction because “[w]hatever merit the
Tribe’s claims may have, they are not claims that depend on the
resolution of a substantial question of federal law—and therefore,
they are not claims that can be decided in federal court.”122 The
lawsuit presented a number of jurisdictional challenges on
review. At the onset, “it [was] clear that an Indian tribe is not a
citizen of any state and cannot sue or be sued in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction. Nor [were] Indian tribes foreign
states.”123 Thus, as diversity jurisdiction was unavailable, the
claim was dependent on a finding of federal question jurisdiction.
While the Oglala cited 18 U.S.C. § 1362, which confers the
court with “original jurisdiction of all civil actions brought by any
Indian tribe or band,” they turned first to the more general federalquestion jurisdictional hook—§ 1331.124 The court moved forward
hesitantly, noting that the statutes cited by the tribe failed to
create a private right of action, and that their claims’ reliance upon
“public policy” concerns did not meet the standard by which an
issue arising under a federal statute can provide jurisdiction.125 For
the court, “[t]he ultimate import of concluding that there is no
federal private cause of action is that it would flout congressional
intent to provide a private federal remedy for the violation of the
federal statutes.”126
Next, the court turned to the actual jurisdictional hook
cited by the Oglala, § 1362. This too was unavailing. Under
121
122
123
124
125
126

See Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Schwarting, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198 (D. Neb. 2012).
Id. at 1205.
Id. at 1198–99 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1199 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1362).
Id. at 1200–01.
Id. at 1201.
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Supreme Court precedent, the district court found that the
common thread through cases that extended jurisdictional
reach under § 1362 is that “they all involved possessory rights of
the tribes to tribal lands.”127 The claims alleged by the Oglala
Sioux related to conspiracy to flout the prohibition of alcohol, not
tribal land. Thus, while the “United States could criminally
prosecute anyone suspected of violating §§ 1154 and 1156, there
[was] no basis . . . for concluding that the United States could, as
a trustee, establish standing to allege the claims that the Tribe
[sought] to allege in this case.”128 As a result, § 1362 did not
extend jurisdiction. The Oglala Sioux were again stymied from
enforcing prohibition within the Pine Ridge Reservation.
III.

THE COOPERATIVE-FEDERALISM APPROACH TO TRIBAL
PROHIBITION
“I am authorized by the great council of the United States to prohibit
[sales of liquor]. I will sincerely cooperate with your wise men in any
proper measures for this purpose.”129
- President Thomas Jefferson

The ramification of the district court’s finding that it
lacked jurisdiction to review the Oglala Sioux’s challenge,
“[regardless of the] merit the Tribe’s claims may have,”130 is
dissatisfying. Congress has delegated the choice of remaining
dry to the tribes but they have been prevented from enforcing
prohibition by transboundary activity. Moreover, neither
legislative nor judicial action has stopped the flow of alcohol into
Indian country. The federal system has given rise to numerous
transboundary environmental disputes that have been litigated
in the United State courts. In fact, “[i]n these cases, the
Supreme Court is acting as an arbiter between sovereign states,
not unlike an international court or arbitration panel”131 as in
the Trail Smelter Case. Domestic history of transboundary
environmental disputes has involved the harmful effects of

Id. at 1204.
Id.
129 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA: A COMPREHENSIVE
COLLECTION OF THE VIEWS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 944 (John P. Foley ed., 1900)
(responding to a letter from Seneca leader Brother Handsome Lake who complained of
the effect alcohol from traders had on his people).
130 Schwarting, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
131 Noah D. Hall, Transboundary Pollution: Harmonizing International and
Domestic Law, 40 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 681, 686 (2007).
127
128
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smelter pollution settling upon a down-wind state,132 and sewage
disposal traveling downstream to another urban setting.133
In the context of our modern domestic environmental
regulations, states are given significant authority to establish
the methods of achieving nationally determined public health
goals. This has been termed a “cooperative-federalism model”134
of regulation. Part of this cooperative approach is federally
allowed state implementation of various quality standards.
Recently, Congress delegated similar authority to Indian tribes.
This has advanced tribal self-government and addressed
environmental justice concerns in Indian country. There are a
variety of well-known examples,135 but this essay will specifically
review Congressional delegation under the CAA and CWA. In
turn, understanding these processes by which tribes can enforce
Congressional delegation will elucidate the cooperative-federalism
nature of federal Indian prohibition.
A.

The Clean Air Act

The purpose of the Clean Air Act is “to protect and enhance
the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”136
The Clean Air Act covers various forms of air emissions,137 applying
to both aging and decrepit power plants as well as ones to be built
in the future.138 To fulfill this broad regulatory mandate, the Clean
132 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co. (Georgia II), 237 U.S. 474 (1915); Georgia v.
Tenn. Copper Co. (Georgia I), 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (Georgia sought to enjoin Tennessee
copper plants from polluting property located in Georgia).
133 Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri II), 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Missouri v. Illinois
(Missouri I), 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (City of Chicago disposing sewage into the Mississippi
that impacted St. Louis).
134 Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on
State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 87 (2007); see also New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992) (“[W]here Congress has the
authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized
Congress’ power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to
federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation . . . . This
arrangement . . . has been termed ‘a program of cooperative federalism.’” (internal
citations omitted)).
135 See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act § 126, 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (2012); Clean Air Act § 301(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)
(2012); Clean Water Act § 518, 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (2012); see also Water Quality
Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (2013) (allowing tribes to exercise regulatory power
without express congressional authorization as long as certain criteria are met).
136 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1).
137 See id. § 7408(a)(1) (criteria pollutants); see also id. § 7412(b) (initial list of
hazardous air pollutants).
138 Todd B. Adams, New Source Review Under the Clean Air Act: Time for
More Market-Based Incentives?, 8 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6 (2000).
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Air Act attempts to preserve air quality through interlaced healthbased and technology-based standards. The National Ambient Air
Quality Standard (NAAQS), defined under the Clean Air Act,
establishes a cap of specified levels of emission for six criteria of air
pollutants. The NAAQS emission caps are designed to reflect an
adequate degree of safety necessary to protect public health.139 The
areas of the country that do not meet the NAAQS for one or more of
the six criteria pollutants are characterized as “nonattainment”
zones for that pollutant140 because they have not “attained” the
proper levels of each criteria pollutant. Likewise, those areas
meeting NAAQS for criteria pollutants are considered “attainment”
zones. While major stationary sources in both attainment and
nonattainment zones must obtain a permit before new
development or modification of the source,141 designation as
nonattainment could significantly impact economic development.142
The distinction also obligates pollution-emitting entities to meet
more aggressive regulatory obligations.
Moreover, the NAAQS regime operates on the basis of a
“cooperative-federalism model.”143 Part of this cooperative
approach is federally allowed state implementation of air
quality standards. The Clean Air Act encourages states to
submit State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to ensure
compliance with the NAAQS.144 A state’s SIP must include a
number of specific pollution control measures. Failure to
submit an adequate SIP by the appropriate deadline subjects
the state to various federal sanctions, such as the loss of
federal highway funds or the imposition of an EPA-enforced
Federal Implementation Plan (FIP).145
The process of ensuring that new sources, or modifications
made to existing sources, meet statutory obligations has become
known as New Source Review (NSR). NSR is an essential
component of the efforts to maintain air quality. At the same
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
Id. at §§ 7501(2), 7407(d)(1)(A)(i).
141 Id. at § 7503(a).
142 See, e.g., Attainment v. Nonattainment, IDAHO DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY,
http://www.deq.idaho.gov/air-quality/monitoring/attainment-v-nonattainment.aspx
(last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (“[I]t is costly and time-consuming to develop and implement
plans to reattain attainment status.”); Air Quality Div., Neb. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, FAQs
About Attainment and Nonattainment, AIR WAVES, http://deq.ne.gov/AirWaves.nsf/
cf7e4bdd49c643bf8625747f005a1515/3b00b887a2bae40b8625748e005ffbf5?OpenDocument
(last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (“[T]here could be indirect, costly consequences due to the
designation.”).
143 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
144 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).
145 Id. § 7410(c)(1)(B).
139

140
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time, the NSR program has been a cause of contention between
the EPA, state air quality agencies, and existing facilities.146 From
its inception, the CAA has required new sources to install
advanced pollution control technology.147 This policy decision
established two different regulatory regimes—those for new and
old sources. While many old sources were “grandfathered” in
such that they were able to continue operating subject to few
restrictions, new sources that produce air pollution “which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”
are required to install federally established new source
performance standards (NSPS).148 The NSR program thus adds
another layer of regulation to facilities that may already be
subject to NSPS standards.
Permitting under NSR is divided into three programs.
First, the prevention of serious deterioration (PSD) program
applies to new major sources or sources making major
modifications to existing sources in attainment zones.149 Second,
the Nonattainment NSR (NNSR) program is designed to promote
air quality in areas that are out of compliance with one or more of
the NAAQS.150 “NSR requires the most stringent emission limits
and also requires sources to offset increased emissions by
reducing emissions elsewhere at the facility, or by obtaining
Emission Reduction Credits (ERCs) from nearby facilities.”151
Finally, the Minor Source NSR program provides permits for
sources not covered by PSD or NNSR. “The purpose of minor NSR
permits is to prevent the construction of sources that would
interfere with attainment or maintenance of a[n] [NAAQS] or
violate the control strategy in nonattainment areas.”152 Together

146 The friction between the EPA and state air quality agencies will be
highlighted infra.
147 See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b).
148 Id. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (requiring the Agency to set emission performance
standards for stationary sources that “cause[ ] or contribute[ ] significantly to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”).
149 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2013).
150 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. S(I).
151 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean Air Act Requirements for Air Pollution
Sources in Indian Country 2, May 2008, available at http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/
tribal/pdf/DetailedAirComplianceRequirements.pdf; see also U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Nonattainment NSR Basic Information, EPA.GOV http://www.epa.gov/NSR/naa.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (“Nonattainment NSR requirements are customized for the
nonattainment area. All nonattainment NSR programs have to require (1) the
installation of the lowest achievable emission rate (LAER), (2) emission offsets, and (3)
opportunity for public involvement.”).
152 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Minor NSR Basic Information, EPA.GOV,
http://www.epa.gov/NSR/minor.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
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these permitting requirements clarify the law governing new
sources of modification to sources throughout the United States.
The last 40 years in federal Indian law have been
marked as a time of tribal self-determination.153 Throughout
this period, the EPA has reinforced this self-determination
model. In 1984, the EPA became the first federal agency to
formally adopt an “Indian policy” governing its interactions
with tribes.154 The policy noted that tribal governments are
“sovereign entities with primary authority and responsibility
for the reservation populace.”155 Accordingly, the policy assumes
tribal regulatory responsibility but is premised upon a default
model where the EPA retains responsibility until a tribe assumes
responsibility.156 Further, the EPA, with tribal assistance, secured
amendments inserting general “treatment as state” (TAS)
provisions157 in most of the major environmental statutes.158
Specifically, for the purposes of administering air programs,
tribes have been granted TAS status under the CAA.159
Next, to implement CAA’s “treatment as states”
provision, the EPA promulgated the Tribal Authority Rule
(TAR) in 1998.160 Under 42 U.S.C. § 7410, tribes can develop
TIPs, the tribal equivalent of State Implementation Plan
(SIPs), to regulate air quality on reservations.161 TIPs are
153 See, e.g., Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal SelfDetermination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 816–23 (2012) (describing the era of selfdetermination and the contemporary federal policy in supporting self-governance).
154 William D. Ruckelshaus, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Policy for the
Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian Reservations (Nov. 8, 1984),
available at http://www.epa.gov/tp/pdf/indian-policy-84.pdf.
155 Id. (emphasis added).
156 Jana B. Milford, Tribal Authority Under the Clean Air Act: How Is It
Working?, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 213, 219–20 (2004).
157 James M. Grijalva & Daniel E. Gogal, The Evolving Path Toward Achieving
Environmental Justice for Native America, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10905 n.46 (2010) (“[TAS]
eligibility criteria vary among the statutory programs but require generally that the tribe be
federally recognized by the U.S. Department of the Interior, have a governing body carrying
out substantial duties and powers, and demonstrate technical capability and legal authority
to manage and protect the Indian country environment.”).
158 See, e.g., Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 506, 101 Stat. 7
(1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)); Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300f(1)); Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 107(d), 108(i), 104 Stat. 2464
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d), 7601(a)(1)); Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 207(e), 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9626).
159 Clean Air Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(1)(B) (2012); see id. § 7474(c)
(stating that re-designation of reservation air quality standards can only be done by
“the appropriate Indian governing body”).
160 Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254
(Feb. 12, 1998).
161 42 U.S.C. § 7410(o) (“Indian tribes. If an Indian tribe submits an
implementation plan to the Administrator pursuant to section 7601(d) of this title, the
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created to implement a regime to regulate air quality to meet
the air quality standards required under the NAAQS,162 and
TIPs must neither interfere with PSD nor hinder the air
quality of neighboring states or tribal areas.163 Unlike SIPs,
TIPs can allow joint tribal and EPA management.164 Finally,
Indian tribes have the same authority as states to petition the
EPA to enforce Clean Air Act requirements on surrounding
states or tribes.165
This regulatory framework has provided tribes
authority to control air quality management decisions affecting
their jurisdiction. Since the 1990 amendments, 32 tribes have
received TAS under the TAR.166 Three separate tribes have
successfully petitioned the EPA for approval of TIPs to implement
and enforce tribally-designed air quality standards.167 Finally,
“one tribe has received a delegation (under Clean Air Act Part 71)
to implement a Title V operating permit program for their
reservation.”168 Such steps have furthered the model articulated
through the EPA’s Indian policy. This program is “based on initial
federal implementation where feasible, with aspirations for later
program assumption by Indian tribal governments.”169 To date,
this pattern has largely been followed. “[T]ribes have
demonstrated increasing interest in developing and administering
their own air programs. As one illustration, the number of tribes
receiving federal grants to initiate or operate air programs has
plan shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions for review set forth in this
section for State plans, except as otherwise provided by regulation promulgated
pursuant to section 7601(d)(2) of this title. When such plan becomes effective in
accordance with the regulations promulgated under section 7601(d) of this title, the
plan shall become applicable to all areas (except as expressly provided otherwise in the
plan) located within the exterior boundaries of the reservation, notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent and including rights-of-way running through the reservation.”).
162 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 49 subparts D–M (2013).
163 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D).
164 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DEVELOPING A TRIBAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
23–24 (2002).
165 See 42 U.S.C. § 7426 (explaining state’s authority to petition the EPA to
exercise its enforcement powers).
166 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Tribal Air: Basic Information, EPA.GOV,
http://www.epa.gov/oar/tribal/backgrnd.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
167 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Approves First Ever Clean Air Act Plan for
Reducing Air Pollution Developed by a Tribe, EPA.GOV (Oct. 30, 2007),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/b1ab9f485b098972852562e7004dc686/d649e3
e21e89eeba85257384006f9422!OpenDocument; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Approves
Nation’s Most Comprehensive Tribal Air Quality Plan, EPA.GOV (Jan. 19, 2011),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/A8A51A1313914FD78525781D0068721B;
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Tribal Air News, EPA.GOV (Nov. 13, 2007),
http://www.epa.gov/air/tribal/pdfs/Nov%202007%20Publication.pdf.
168 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 166.
169 Grijalva & Gogal, supra note 157, at 10905.

1224

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:3

grown from about 20 in 1995 to more than 120 in 2002.”170 Tribes
have exercised the power to develop permitting programs for new
or modified stationary source polluters,171 craft and implement
CAA air quality standards,172 and potentially influence
neighboring states’ air policies.173
Air pollution has a distinctly extraterritorial nature. So too,
it seems, does the flow of alcohol. Both programs are permitting
tribes additional authority that Congress has delegated to address
specific public health concerns.
B.

The Clean Water Act

Like the concerns that inspired the passage of CAA,
Congress has recognized the threat that unclean water posed to
public health and welfare. In response, Congress enacted the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) in 1948 to
“establish a national policy for the prevention, control and
abatement of water pollution.”174 The FWPCA was amended
and eventually codified as the Clean Water Act (CWA) that
included the objective of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s
waters.”175 The CWA also operates under a cooperativefederalism regime. Thus, “[w]hile the EPA is responsible for
setting minimum WQSs [Water Quality Standards] for certain
pollutants that all states must meet, states are free to set
standards that are more stringent than the EPA requires.”176
Like the CAA, the CWA also treats tribes like states for
specific regulation. The “‘Treatment as a State’ or ‘TAS’
provision was a ‘prequalification’ requirement that, once
satisfied, allowed the qualifying tribe to become eligible to
apply for these grants and program approvals.”177 Importantly,
tribes are permitted to address up-stream pollution.178 To do so,
Milford, supra note 156, at 213–14.
42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(5) (2012).
172 Id. § 7410.
173 Vanessa Baehr-Jones & Christina Cheung, An Exercise of Sovereignty:
Attaining Attainment for Indian Tribes Under the Clean Air Act, 34 ENVIRONS ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y J. 189, 191 (2011).
174 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1948), superseded by Pub. L. No. 92-500 § 2, 88 Stat. 816 (1972).
175 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2012).
176 Marren Sanders, Clean Water in Indian Country: The Risks (and Rewards) of
Being Treated in the Same Manner as a State, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 533, 536 (2010).
177 Id. at 537; see also Royster, supra note 44, at 206.
178 Royster, supra note 44, at 206 (“[A]ny [National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System] permit issued for a point source upstream of the tribe’s territory,
whether the permit issued by the EPA or the state pursuant to a delegated NPDES
170

171

2014]

GOOD FENCES MAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS

1225

they must petition the EPA—who may grant approval—which
is then used by the tribe to limit pollution that can impact their
local water quality.
This ability to enforce water quality beyond Indian
country is similar to the needs of tribes to enforce prohibition
beyond the reaches of Indian country. Because both of these
models fit within a cooperative-federalism scheme, this process
could serve as a model for reform.
IV.

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RESPONSES TO TRIBAL
PROHIBITION

A.

Identifying a Private Right of Action

While the Oglala Sioux were foiled in the district court,
this does not need to be the end of their legal challenges. To
begin, the case was dismissed without prejudice.179 There is a
chance to replay this challenge. Nationally, tribes concerned
about similar transboundary harms should consider raising
these challenges in different federal courts. This is much like
federal agencies defending their statutory interpretation in
different circuit courts.180
Additionally, raising a statutory claim is a classic
strategy in the environmental justice toolbox. As Luke Cole has
noted, environmental law claims are preferred over all other
strategies.181 However, before challenges are raised, additional
thinking about how to articulate a private right of action is
necessary. As the district court expressed in Schwarting, “none
of the statutes cited create a private right of action” that can be
alleged by the tribe.182 Without a right of action, there is no
jurisdiction, and without jurisdiction, the claims will be
dismissed. Stating that Congress implied a right of action183 is
in many ways a long-shot. Generally, a private citizen cannot
file suit under a federal statute unless Congress has
program, must include conditions to ensure compliance with the downstream tribe’s
[Water Quality Standards].”).
179 Schwarting, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
180 Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 735-36 (1989) (“Given the lack of intercircuit
stare decisis, and the reasons underlying our system of intercircuit dialogue, an agency’s
ability to engage in intercircuit nonacquiescence should not be constrained.”).
181 Cole, supra note 55, at 526 (discussing the litigation hierarchy).
182 Schwarting, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
183 An implied right of action allows private individuals to file lawsuits under
a federal statute that does not explicitly provide for such a right.
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manifested its intent for such suit.184 In cases involving implied
rights of action, federal courts look at the statutory language
and legislative intent (solely to clarify the text).185
By delegating the power to tribal governments to
regulate alcohol throughout their reservations, the tribes are in
fact acting as agents of the federal government.186 From this
perspective, the language of both §§ 3113 and 1161 suggest
that a right of action does exist to enforce prohibition beyond
the reservation’s border. First, under § 3113, the language of
the statute indicates congressional intent for tribes to enforce
prohibition. The section specifically provides that “any Indian
may take and destroy any ardent spirits or wine found in the
Indian country.”187 Next, the section permits any Indian to seize
and destroy alcohol found on fee land—land belonging to the
Reservation.188 Thus, “the grant to ‘any Indian’ would be
construed as also authorizing the organized efforts of the tribal
government to make effective use of this power.”189 This
empowered tribal members to take actions in furtherance of
prohibition against non-members. Undercutting this argument,
however, is that, following the reauthorization of § 3113,
Congress narrowed the authority of tribes in §§ 1154 and 1156
to exclude non-members and pass-through roads from
regulation. A court may view these subsequent enactments as
constricting broad power of tribes to enforce prohibition.
Second, under § 1161, Congress gave Indian tribes the
authority to maintain prohibition in Indian country. Few federal
courts have reviewed the full extent of this delegation. In City of
Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, the Eighth Circuit
held that § 1161 provided tribes the authority to regulate alcohol
throughout land within the boundaries of the reservation—
including non-member communities.190 Importantly, the court

184 See e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 732-34 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (reviewing history of Supreme Court decisions implying or prohibiting a
private right of action).
185 JOHN C. JEFFRIES ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE
CONSTITUTION 283 (2000). See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001);
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979).
Without proof of intent, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one,
no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the
statute.” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286–87.
186 Baker, supra note 13, at 714.
187 18 U.S.C. § 3113 (2012).
188 Id.
189 Baker, supra note 13, at 716.
190 10 F.3d 554, 558 (8th Cir. 1993).
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viewed tribal jurisdiction over the flow of alcohol as spanning the
“reservation’s four corners.”191
Asserting enforcement beyond the four corners of the
reservation is a leap. The Supreme Court has been cautious
when permitting extraterritorial enforcement. Historically,
however, “the United States can, through treaties with Indian
tribes, preempt state regulations affecting off-reservation
treaty rights.”192 For example, in United States v. Forty-Three
Gallons of Whiskey, the Court held that the United States and
the Red Lake and Pembina Band of Chippewa Indians could
agree by treaty to extend federal prohibition to lands ceded by
the tribe in treaty agreements.193 Like Whiteclay, Nebraska,
the ceded lands were organized into a county in Minnesota but
the Court held that this was within Congress’s treaty power.
Also, in United States v. Holliday,194 the Court held that
Congress could enact a statute preempting state law to prohibit
the sale of liquor to individual Indians in a county where there
was no Indian reservation. Finally, the Court has more
recently described the limits of congressional power. In Perrin
v. United States,195 the Court held that “the power [to control
the flow of alcohol] is incident only to the presence of the
Indians and their status as wards of the Government, [and
thus] it must be conceded that it does not go beyond what is
reasonably essential to their protection.”196 Moreover, “to be
effective, its exercise must not be purely arbitrary, but founded
upon some reasonable basis.”197 Ultimately, the test settles
upon wide discretion for Congress to act.198
While it helps to view the prohibition delegation to tribes as
akin to delegation to tribes to enforce environmental regulations,
there are clear distinctions. Unlike Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey,
enforcement of prohibition in Pine Ridge is not based upon treaty
obligations. In fact, it should be remembered that President
Roosevelt specifically sold off the buffer zone created around the
reservation. Additionally, unlike the CAA and CWA, Congress did
not provide a concrete mechanism to enforce these regulations
Id.
Skibine, supra note 12, at 1031.
193 93 U.S. 188, 189 (1876).
194 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1865).
195 232 U.S. 478 (1914).
196 Id. at 482, 486.
197 Id. at 486.
198 Id. (“[I]t must also be conceded that, in determining what is reasonably
essential to the protection of the Indians, Congress is invested with a wide discretion, and
its action, unless purely arbitrary, must be accepted and given full effect by the courts.”).
191
192
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beyond the border. In fact, many scholars have even found the City
of Timber Lake’s hold to be an overly broad application of the
statute and Supreme Court precedent.199 However, while the
history of alcohol prohibition has trended toward restricting the
ability of tribes to make decisions concerning alcohol—based upon
the drunken Indian myth—the best indication of congressional
intent is the delegation of authority to the tribes. If this delegation
is to mean anything, tribes must be able to assert prohibition
beyond their borders.
B.

File a Public Nuisance Suit

If the door to the courts remains closed to statutory
challenges, tribes should seek to file a public nuisance suit.
Importantly, “public nuisance law provides the broadest potential
for raising environmental justice claims.”200 Public nuisance claims
are premised on the notion that someone’s actions are
“unreasonable given the circumstances and could cause injury to
someone exercising a common, societal right.”201 Other types of
public nuisance include interfering with public health and safety.202
Admittedly, public nuisance suits face an uphill battle in
court, and the likelihood of obtaining a positive ruling in a public
nuisance suit is attenuated at best. To begin, the special injury
rule/different-in-kind doctrine limits the type of plaintiff who can
bring this tort action. In particular, “[o]nly those who can first
prove some injury that is ‘special,’ ‘particular,’ or ‘peculiar,’
defined as ‘different-in-kind’ and not just ‘different-in-degree’ from
the general public who might also be affected by the nuisance, be
it a house of prostitution or a polluting factory, may bring an
action.”203 Few state courts have shifted away from the traditional
different-in-kind standard.204 This makes it difficult to raise
environmental justice claims through public nuisance.
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 13, at 719-21.
Mandy Garrells, Raising Environmental Justice Claims Through the Law
of Public Nuisance, 20 VILL. EVNTL. L.J. 163, 163 (2009).
201 Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance:
Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541 (2012).
202 See Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 635-36 (D.R.I. 1990).
Examples include storing explosives within the city, interfering with reasonable noise levels
at night, or interfering with breathable air, such as through emitting noxious odors into the
public domain. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. b (1979).
203 Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of
the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 761 (2001); see also Garrells, supra note
200, at 163–64.
204 See, e.g., Akau v. Olohana Corp., 652 P.2d 1130, 1133-35 (Haw. 1982)
(articulating federal injury-in-fact criteria).
199

200
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In the context of climate change litigation, advocates for
climate justice raising tort claims have also been stymied in the
federal courts.205 First, in American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut (AEP),206 the Supreme Court held that the Clean
Air Act (CAA) displaced any federal common law claims
against carbon-dioxide emissions.207 Second, in Native Village of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,208 the Ninth Circuit held that the
CAA displaced all federal public nuisance claims.209 These
decisions effectively close the door to the use of tort-based
claims to address climate change. However, tort litigation in
state courts may provide an area for successful litigation.210
Notwithstanding the high bar of proving negligence,
duty, and causality, courts are hesitant for three additional
reasons. First, courts might be hesitant to regulate conduct of
an industry because regulation is not a core competency of the
judiciary. Second, judges may fear criticism for stretching the
boundaries of tort law to cover conduct that is attenuated to
the plaintiff’s injury. Finally, there is a concern about
developing “slippery slope” precedent.211
As a result of these constrictions on public nuisance
claims, while tribes like the Oglala Sioux could utilize public
nuisance theory to effectuate prohibition, the bar will be high.
They will need to establish that the conduct is the type covered
by nuisance theory. Factually, they will be required to establish
a linkage between the distribution of alcohol outside their
reservation and the significant health effects that result. Doing
so will require development of a detailed record and could be
quite costly. This limits the overall effectiveness of public
nuisance suits as an environmental justice tool.

205 See Sean J. Wright, Response, Shifting Tides: Moving Climate Change Litigation
Beyond Business as Usual, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012), http://www.floridalawreview.com/wpcontent/uploads/Wright_Forum.pdf (discussing the failings of climate based public
nuisance suits).
206 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
207 Id. at 2537 (“[T]he Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes
displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions
from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”).
208 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 2013 WL 794333 (Feb.
25, 2013) (No. 12-1072).
209 Id. at 858 (extending the rule established in AEP).
210 See Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-11-002194
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 2, 2012); Wright, supra note 205.
211 Eric L. Kintner, Note, Bad Apples and Smoking Barrels: Private Actions
for Public Nuisance Against the Gun Industry, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1163, 1231 (2005).

1230

C.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:3

Amend Title 18 to Empower the Tribes to Effectuate
Prohibition

If the preceding challenges are unsuccessful, tribal
members should strongly consider lobbying Congress to provide
tribes the ability to truly enforce prohibition. Delegating this
responsibility to tribes is only a half-measure. Tribes must also be
given the ability to enforce prohibition beyond reservation borders.
In this respect, prohibition policy is like environmental policy. In
both the CAA and CWA, tribes are treated like states and are
provided a method to enforce these statutes outside their
jurisdiction. To prevent transboundary harms, Congress should
expand tribal power beyond reservation boundaries.212 Specifically,
amending Title 18 to mirror congressional delegations under the
CAA and CWA will empower tribes to actually enforce
prohibition—a choice they are permitted to make within the
cooperative-federalism scheme.
A possible amendment would establish a petition authority
permitting tribes to petition the EPA to find that a site endangers
public health beyond the requisite threshold and would have
serious, harmful impacts upon the nearby states.213 As applied,
tribes would retain the ability to enforce prohibition and would be
permitted to petition the EPA to gain approval to enforce this
policy in federal court.214 This approach is similar to that codified in
the CAA and CWA which permits tribes to extraterritorially
enforce CWA after receiving EPA approval. While both processes
require federal approval—thus undercutting tribal prerogatives—
this is consistent with the conceptualization of prohibition as
cooperative-federalism. As Sarah Krakoff has noted, tribal
environmental justice utilizes regulatory authority as a means of
furthering self-government.215 Because tribes do not retain absolute
sovereignty in this context, unlike many others where tribal
authority is significant, this scheme is understandable. Just as
states are forced to seek federal approval of myriad programs,
tribes would be too. This scheme would permit tribes to fulfill their
decision to remain dry by garnering federal support of
212 I am not the only scholar to suggest empowering the tribes is a logical and
necessary step to protect public health. See Cody McBride, Note, Making Pollution
Inefficient Through Empowerment, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 405, 436–37 (2012).
213 See 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (2012) (explaining state’s authority to petition the
EPA to exercise its enforcement powers).
214 Tribes should petition the EPA over other agencies within this proposed
reconfiguration of prohibition policy because alcohol is to be understood as an
environmental harm.
215 See supra note 18.
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extraterritorial enforcement of prohibition. This would promote
environmental justice in Indian country.
*
*
*
The story of the Oglala Sioux’s fight against the flow of
alcohol on the Pine Ridge reservation has undergone a recent,
significant change. Bowing to growing pressure to legalize the sale
of alcohol, hopeful for the opportunity to regulate its use, and
frankly exhausted from decades of conflict, the tribe voted to end
prohibition.216 In a close election—1,871 for legalization and 1,679
against it—the lasting sentiment of those supporting the end of
prohibition was that the history of the Pine Ridge reservation
showed that “prohibition didn’t work.”217 Under the new law, “the
tribe will own and operate stores on the reservation, and profits
will be used for education and detoxification and treatment centers,
for which there is currently little to no funding.”218 Opponents of
the law fear that the change will, at best, begin reducing
dependence on alcohol, but that alcohol-related crime and violence
will spike.219 At bottom, “[b]oth sides in the debate do agree
something must be done to limit the scourge of alcohol on the
Lakota people. They also share a goal of putting out of business the
current main suppliers of booze—four stores in Whiteclay,
Neb[raska].”220
CONCLUSION
The flow of alcohol into Indian country is a serious public
health concern. New ideas are needed to address its harmful
consequences. This essay has framed prohibition policy in an
environmental justice context. This illustrates how sham towns,
such as Whiteclay, are located near poor communities just as
polluting facilities are located in or around poor communities. Both
establish inequitable distributions of environmental hazards.
Moreover, the siting of alcohol distribution centers can be
considered LULUs just as local smelting plants are. But tribal
governments have limited jurisdiction to assert their rights. This
raises the question, does “tribal sovereignty . . . end at the
reservation border[?]”221 This essay has suggested a variety of new
216 Carson Walker, South Dakota Indian Reservation Legalizes Alcohol, Ends
Prohibition, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2013, 1:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/
08/15/indian-reservation-legalizes-alcohol_n_3759346.html.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Skibine, supra note 12, 1004.
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approaches based upon concrete environmental justice strategies to
address this problem. Conceptualizing prohibition as an
environmental justice concern—for the first time—highlights the
breadth of tools available to the environmental poverty lawyer.
Tribal governments can reassert statutory authorization of a
private cause of action, bring a public nuisance suit, or lobby
Congress to amend Title 18 to further empower tribes. Any of these
strategies, if successful, would be ideal. Regardless, until change
occurs, tribal communities will continue to struggle against an
increasing threat from the flow of alcohol. This is an injustice.

